Chopper

Category: backdoor · Aliases: Backdoor:Win32/Chopper, China Chopper, Trojan:ASP/Chopper, Win32/Chopper, China Chopper Web Shell · Sample count (EMBER 2018): 14 · Enrichment: curated_sourced · Updated: 2026-10-15
Category: BackdoorStatus: Automated SignaturePlatform: WINDOWS_PEStage: Persistence, Command And Control, Remote AccessActor: Unknown / CybercriminalIndustry: Global / OpportunisticMotivation: Opportunistic🕸 Explore Relationship Graph⚙ API JSON⚡ Sigma Rule💾 YARA RuleOS: Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows Server 2022
Executive Summary
Chopper (widely tracked across cybersecurity research, CISA advisories, and EDR platforms as China Chopper, Backdoor:Win32/Chopper, and Trojan:ASP/Chopper) is a legendary, ultra-compact webshell and remote administration platform first documented in 2012.

Table of Contents

Overview

Chopper (widely tracked across cybersecurity research, CISA advisories, and EDR platforms as China Chopper, Backdoor:Win32/Chopper, and Trojan:ASP/Chopper) is a legendary, ultra-compact webshell and remote administration platform first documented in 2012. Measuring as small as 4 kilobytes (or a single line of text, e.g., eval(request("cmd")) in ASPX or eval($_POST["cmd"]) in PHP), Chopper delivers full server management capabilities when paired with its specialized Windows GUI client (chopper.exe). The Windows client interacts with the server-side payload over standard HTTP POST requests, enabling operators to browse and manipulate the remote filesystem, execute interactive command-line commands, transfer files, dump database contents via embedded SQL query interfaces, and initiate lateral movement across corporate networks.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

→ Explore the complete 226-Technique ATT&CK Threat Matrix

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

D3FEND IDCountermeasure NameTacticCountered ATT&CKDefensive Guidance
D3-BDABinary De-obfuscation & UnpackingAnalyzeT1027Utilize memory dump scanners and entropy inspection to unpack encrypted stagers during process creation.
D3-SEAScript Execution AnalysisDetectT1059Analyze script block syntax and command arguments at runtime to detect malicious automation.
D3-WAFWeb Content Filtering & InspectionFilterT1071.001Block newly registered domains (NRDs) and inspect HTTP Host and URI headers for known C2 profiles.

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)

Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.

rule MALWARE_WIN_CHOPPER_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Chopper"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "chopper" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "backdoor:win32/chopper" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "china chopper" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan:asp/chopper" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/chopper" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "china chopper web shell" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)

Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Chopper (Backdoor) Execution & Triage
id: 71ce2624-55fc-5c9c-a85e-5a8bab540459
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Chopper malware family. Detects proxy execution, reflective DLL loading,
  and remote command injection associated with modular enterprise backdoors.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/chopper
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.backdoor
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1505_003
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1059_001
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1083
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    - \regsvr32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - DownloadString
    - IEX(
    - '/s /n /u /i:'
    - sc create
    - start-process
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)

Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.

rule MALWARE_WIN_CHOPPER_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Chopper tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "chopper" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
SOC & SIEM Rule Downloads: ⬇ Download YARA Rule (.yar) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (YAML) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (JSON) ⚙ Threat Profile API (JSON)

Containment & Response Steps

Home Users: If you suspect a malware infection on your personal device, disconnect from the internet immediately and run a full system scan with your antivirus software (see our TotalAV Antivirus & Security Support Guide). The steps below are intended for IT professionals responding to enterprise incidents.

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

  1. Isolate the compromised web server from the internal network immediately to prevent lateral movement, but keep it online to capture live traffic logs.
  2. Analyze IIS/Apache access logs to identify the exact file path of the web shell (look for high volumes of POST requests to a specific file).
  3. Review the web server process execution logs (EDR) to identify what commands the attacker executed via `cmd.exe` or `powershell.exe`.
  4. Once the shell is located, remove the malicious code, but more importantly, identify and patch the initial vulnerability that allowed the upload (e.g., an unpatched CMS plugin).

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

  1. Do not simply delete the web shell file and put the server back into production; the attacker will immediately exploit the same vulnerability to upload a new shell.
  2. Avoid relying solely on file-based antivirus to find web shells; a one-line PHP `eval()` statement is often not flagged as malicious by static scanners.

References & External Analysis

North American Authority Advisory (CISA / NIST)

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has published an official US federal advisory on this family, which can be mapped to NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) incident response controls: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-200a ↗

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Backdoor:Win32/Chopper (China Chopper)?

China Chopper is an ultra-compact webshell and remote administration tool client widely used by APT groups and cybercriminals.

How does the China Chopper client communicate with the webshell?

The Windows client transmits command payloads inside HTTP POST parameters disguised as ordinary web requests.

What capabilities does China Chopper provide to attackers?

File browsing and modification, arbitrary command-line execution, database query management, and traffic tunneling.

Why is China Chopper so difficult to detect statically?

The server-side component is as short as one line of code, blending easily into legitimate web application scripts.

How can defenders detect China Chopper activity?

Inspect web server access logs for anomalous HTTP POST requests with executable code or base64 parameters, and monitor process spawning from w3wp.exe.

How do I remove Chopper from Windows?

Manual removal of Chopper is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.

Is Chopper a virus or a Backdoor?

Chopper is classified as a Backdoor. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Chopper typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.

What are the main symptoms of a Chopper infection?

Symptoms of Chopper can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.

Protect Your Network Against Backdoors

Want to prevent Chopper and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Backdoor & RAT Protection for Businesses.

📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?

Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.

Need help with an active incident? Published by the SystemHelpdesk Threat Intelligence Team.

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/chopper.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.